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Recent events along the Indo–Myanmar border have proven that India’s Narendra Modi
government has a different playbook when it comes to pro-active responses against groups that
harm Indian national interests.
On 4 June, the Indian Army suffered its worst casualties in almost a decade when 18 soldiers
were killed [1] and 14 injured in an attack by insurgents belonging to the National Socialist
Council of Nagaland’s Khaplang faction (NSCN-K [2]) in Chandel district, Manipur. The Indian
government was quick to respond by launching a special forces operation in the early hours of 9
June. Operation Peace led to attacks on insurgent [3] camps belonging to the NSCN-K [4].
While operations across or along the Indo–Myanmar border are nothing new for the Indian
military, the government made two significant departures from the norm. The swift Indian
response came less than a week after the ambush of the Indian soldiers in Manipur and was
approved at the highest levels [5] of the Indian government.
The government also broke its cardinal rule of ‘silence’ following special-forces operations.
While the initial Indian Army statement cloaked the operation in ambiguity and reported that it
was carried out along the border, Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting
Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore told media [6] that the ‘surgical strikes had been carried out a few
kilometres inside Myanmar’.
Zaw Htay, the director of the office of Myanmar President Thein Sein, also acknowledged [7] the
fact that the operation was carried out inside Myanmar. This is not surprising given that both
countries have been jointly [8] carrying out coordinated operations since 1986. In 2010, India and
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Myanmar signed an agreement [9] allowing Indian forces to pursue insurgents across the border.
This was followed by a memorandum of understanding signed [10] in May 2014 that provided for
coordinated patrolling and intelligence sharing.
India’s decision to own up to the operations was a political one. Rathore’s statement was a
calculated strategy to signal India’s intent. The statement [11] that ‘India would carry out surgical
strikes at the time and place of our choosing against any future attacks against Indians’ was
directed at Pakistan without specifically naming the country. This was followed up with another
statement by Union Minister Prakash Javadekar [12] that the operation ‘speaks volumes about
India’s resolve to fight terror. This is a lesson and a message to all the terror groups that India
will not hesitate in going beyond its geographical borders to eliminate terrorists’.
But having let the proverbial cat out of the bag, the Indian government failed to shape the media
narrative. Following these statements, the successful military operation caused a frenzy on 
news channels [13] and social media [14]. The race for viewership resulted in the casualty figures
being inflated [15] from 15–20 to about 100 and circulation of fake pictures [16] of the army
personnel allegedly involved in the cross-border raids.
The media hype has come at a cost. Owning up to Indian involvement blew the cover of
plausible deniability, went against standard operating procedures [17] and ultimately put
Naypyidaw on the back foot. Going back on the earlier statement, Myanmar then denied [18] that
Indian forces had entered its territory. During Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval’s visit
to Myanmar on 17 June, Naypyidaw turned down [19] India’s proposal for joint operations
against NSCN-K cadres.
The Indian government’s failure to ensure a flow of reliable information and poor media
management put avoidable pressure on an ally, damaged [20] a bilateral relationship carefully
cultivated over decades and squandered [21] a moment of success.
Given the possibility of successful negotiations [22] between the Indian government and the 
NSCN faction led by Isak Swu and T. Muivah [23] (NSCN-IM), the Indian military’s offensive
against the Khaplang faction has stoked fears of revenge attacks [24] by the group in cooperation
with other insurgent groups. The prevailing situation and the Indian military offensive could
result in increased attacks against Indian security forces in the future.
The entire episode has raised hackles in Pakistan with statements from Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif [25] and other political [26] and military leaders [27]. Pakistani generals warned India against
carrying out any similar ‘misadventure’ in Pakistan. If the Indian government were to launch a
surgical strike into Pakistan in the future, the Indian military will come up against an adversary
on the guard. India’s leaders have unwittingly made an already difficult task much more
arduous.
Following the Indian ministers’ statements, the media went overboard with unwarranted
comparisons between the successful operation in Myanmar and future operations in Pakistan.
Such comparisons are akin to comparing chalk and cheese.
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In Myanmar, Indian forces were working alongside a cooperative ally and targeting Indian
insurgent groups. A special-forces operation against Pakistan-based anti-India terrorist groups
would face stronger defences and a Pakistani military determined to thwart Indian efforts. India
will also have to ponder how to contain the possible escalation of the operations into a
potentially wider conflict.
If India’s intent was to signal New Delhi’s resolve in tackling any future anti-India attacks, the
Indian Army’s initial statement would have been good enough. After taking a risky political
decision to launch the special-forces operation into Myanmar, the Indian government took
another calculated risk in publicly signalling its resolve in responding proactively to any future
attacks on Indian interests. But it did little to actively handle the flow of reliable information,
allowing the media to run riot.
While the military succeeded in achieving its objectives, India’s political leadership failed to
capitalise on the opportunity to effectively put across a larger message. This misstep whittled
down a well-deserved military success and ended up straining two important bilateral
relationships.
Arun Vishwanathan is an assistant professor at the International Strategic and Security Studies
Programme [28], National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. He tweets @ArunVish_
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[5] highest levels: 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/rajyavardhan-singh-rathore-lauds-ar
my-operation-in-myanmar-says-it-is-beginning/articleshow/47606435.cms
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[12] Prakash Javadekar: 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-in-school/myanmar-operation-a-lesson-to-terro
r-groups/article7302978.ece
[13] news channels: 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/video/para-commandos-avenge-manipur-attack-indo-myanma
r-border/1/443417.html




[16] fake pictures: 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/viral-but-not-true-govt-denies-issuing-pic-of-
army-s-myanmar-operation/article1-1357351.aspx
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[22] possibility of successful negotiations: 
http://www.catchnews.com/india/manipur-myanmar-attacks-why-the-violence-is-unlikely-
to-stop-1434286210.html














[28] International Strategic and Security Studies Programme: http://isssp.in/
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